



THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

*Special file*  
*for Mr. [unclear]*  
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REFER TO OSD

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL MOORER

UCS REVIEWED 14-Jul-2010: NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION

Subj: Mission Change for United States Forces in Southeast Asia

1. The President has requested that you undertake an immediate, close-hold review of our rules-of-engagement for U.S. ground combat forces in Southeast Asia. The purpose of your examination is to provide a specific list of continuing military actions which must be authorized should a date be announced for cessation of U.S. ground combat operations in South Vietnam.

2. The White House recognizes the many problems posed <sup>by</sup> a public statement which implies that all ground combat operations have been turned over to the RVNAF. Your memo of 27 April (Tab A) has illuminated the inherent problems of security, morale, leadership and political credibility in any mission change. The President desires that we deflect these problems by constructing positive parameters of authority for the continuing safety of troops.

3. Much of the impetus for a public pronouncement comes from the threat of Congressional actions that could "vote us out of Vietnam" by deprivation of funds or establishment of a firm withdrawal date -- either of which would prevent necessary flexibility in a disengagement consistent with our national interests.

4. One possible scenario for a Presidential Statement could involve the following steps:

- a mid-June meeting between President's Nixon and Thieu
- Thieu's concurrent announcement that he will no longer require U.S. ground combat operations after a certain date (possibly 1 July 1971).
- His reaffirmation that he will require continued air, logistics and intelligence support.

OSD REVIEWED 30-Nov-2011: NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION

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- President Nixon's reply that he welcomes Thieu's decision, that we will proceed with an orderly withdrawal, and that we will continue actively to defend ourselves throughout the withdrawal process.

5. The White House seeks your assessment of what ~~and~~ protective measures might be involved in the last point enumerated above. The President probably will identify these defensive actions in his announcement. The following items are typical of initiatives we may wish to preserve and emphasize:

- Maintenance of adequate B-52 and tactical air sortie levels.
- Active patrols to prevent surprise attack.
- Continuing H&I fire.
- Suspension of pre-planned offensive operations.
- Authority to maneuver in self-defense.

6. The most recent change in MACV's mission statement was approved by Secretary Laird on 15 August 1969.

a. It provided for the following undertakings:

- Maximum assistance in equipping the RVNAF.
- Accelerated pacification, CIVIC Action and Security programs.
- Military operations designed to improve the RVNAF and provide security to U.S. Forces.
- Military operations to reduce the flow of enemy material and manpower support.
- Plans for a comprehensive air and naval campaign.

b. It eliminated the following objectives:

- defeat of externally directed and supported communist subversion and aggression.
- Attainment of a stable and independent non-communist government in South Vietnam.

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- defeat of the VC and NVA in South Vietnam and the forced withdrawal of NVA forces.
- Extension of GVN dominion, direction and control over all of South Vietnam.
- deterrence of CPR direct intervention and defeat of such intervention if it occurs.
- actions necessary to make difficult and as costly as possible the continued support of the VC by NVN, and to cause NVN to cease its direction of the VC insurgency.

7. The JCS solicited the views of General Abrams in the formulation of a new mission statement in July 1969. He stated that he saw no grounds for a revolutionary change in strategy or tactics. He reaffirmed the "one-war concept", wherein we put equal emphasis on military operations, improvement of the RVNAF and pacification. The Chairman, JCS commented as follows:

"The matter of the credibility of General Abrams, CINCPAC, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the President. We would anticipate that, following an announcement that a change of mission has been directed, the press will make maximum effort to ascertain the difference the change in mission has made to the operations of the troops in the field. We consider that it will be difficult if not impossible, for subordinate commanders to point out changes in operating procedures which will satisfy the news media. This will immediately create one or both of two problems: we are endeavoring at the Washington level to mislead the public and/or General Abrams is not obeying the orders he has received from the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In either case a credibility gap will be created."

8. Although the situation is vastly different today than in August 1969, you may wish to review the following key papers:

- Tab A: CM-855-71 of 27 April 1971, in which you expressed strong reservations concerning future changes in our public stance on U.S. Ground Combat Operations.
- Tab B: SECDEF Memo of 15 Aug 1969 setting forth the <sup>current</sup> Mission Statement.

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Tab C: JCSM-474-69 of 30 July 1969, in which the JCS tactly accepted the new mission change, while pointing out that a public statement could jeopardize the credibility of the Administration.

Tab D: JCSM-443-69 of 18 July 1969, in which the JCS expressed strong disagreement in any mission change. Of particular interest are the views of General Abrams and General Wheeler at the yellow tabs.

Very respectfully,

R. C. ROBINSON



THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

ETS-HR 6648

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CM-855-71

27 APR 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subj: US Redeployments from Southeast Asia (U)

1. (TS) Reference is made to your memorandum, dated 21 April 1971, subject as above, which postulated an assumption that all ground combat responsibilities will have been turned over to the RVNAF by 1 July 1971.
2. (TS) While the Joint Chiefs of Staff will submit a separate review of the plans for the remaining US forces as requested by the reference, I would like to invite to your immediate attention one facet of your memorandum which I judge could be seriously misconstrued.
3. (TS) It is visualized that the scope of our effort must be reduced and that all ground combat operations which are inherently offensive in nature will have to be turned over to the RVNAF as soon as practicable. However, I am deeply concerned about the adverse impacts arising from a literal interpretation of a statement that US forces remaining in the RVN after 1 July 1971 will not engage in any form of ground combat operations. A rigid interpretation of the assumption as stated in the reference would be undesirably inhibiting for the following reasons:
  - a. In order for our forces to adequately defend themselves and their installations, there is a requirement for active patrolling. A static defense policy would most certainly result in an increasing number of incidents such as that which occurred recently at Fire Support Base MARY ANN.
  - b. There will be a continuing requirement to protect US artillery employed on fire support bases, as well as US airfields, helicopter installations, and communication centers. As US redeployments continue, we may be required to depend primarily on the RVNAF for protection of larger joint-use

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installations such as Danang Airfield. However, I believe we would be open to severe criticism and adverse publicity should a US artillery unit be overrun while occupying a fire support base protected exclusively by RVNAF, or by US forces which were inhibited from taking the optimum defensive measures.

c. Severe leadership and morale problems could arise should US soldiers, having been told that the RVNAF had assumed responsibility for all ground combat operations, be required to participate in defensive patrolling beyond the perimeters of their installations. Active patrolling actions on routes of approach to installations are an essential element of defense in the type of war underway in RVN.

4. (TS) In order to preclude the many and various pitfalls inherent in the possible interpretations of the phrase "all ground combat responsibilities," I strongly recommend that any public pronouncements or official documents refer instead to, "passing to the RVNAF primary responsibility for ground offensive combat operations."

(Sgd) T. H. MOORER

T. H. MOORER  
Chairman  
Joint Chiefs of Staff

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SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

15 AUG 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Statement of Mission of United States Forces in Southeast Asia


We have been considering for the past few weeks a revision in the mission statement for the United States forces in Southeast Asia. The discussion and study, to which you have contributed so constructively, have been helpful in a number of respects. By focusing on the issue of the mission statement we have been able, inter alia, to:

- . Reassess the Department of Defense instructions for consistency with the President's policies.
- . Check for consistency between the Department of Defense's policy statements on the one hand and actions in the field on the other.

I have discussed the mission statement with the President and his Assistant for National Security Affairs. I have informed them of the discussions we have had within the Department of Defense and of the alternative proposals on the mission statement. The alternatives included, of course, retaining the current statement.

In my judgment, the current mission statement does not adequately reflect the President's policy guidelines nor the operational realities in Southeast Asia. I believe, therefore, an updated mission statement is necessary. I would appreciate, therefore, the issuance of the attached mission statement and its inclusion in the appropriate documents.

I intend to make no public announcement about the revised statement. It would seem to me to be advisable to handle this matter as low-key as possible.



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Page 1 of 1 Page

TOP SECRET - SENSITIVEUpdated Statement of Mission of U.S. Forces in SEA

"The objective is to allow the people of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) to determine their future without outside interference. To that end, and as directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, CINCPAC and COMUSMACV should assist the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) to take over an increasing share of combat operations. The tactical goal of the combat operations is to defeat the subversion and aggression which is intended to deny self-determination to the RVN people. This overall mission encompasses the following undertakings:

"(a) Provide maximum assistance in developing, training, and equipping the RVNAF as rapidly as possible.

"(b) Continue military support for accelerated pacification, civic action and security programs.

"(c) Conduct military operations designed to accelerate improvement in the RVNAF and to continue to provide security for US forces.

"(d) Conduct military operations to reduce the flow of materiel and manpower support for enemy forces in SVN.

"(e) Maintain plans for a comprehensive air and naval campaign in Vietnam."

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**TOP SECRET SENSITIVE**THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301JCSM-474-69  
30 July 1969

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Statement of Mission of US Forces in Southeast Asia (U)

## 1. (TS) Reference is made to:

a. JCSM-443-69, dated 18 July 1969, subject as above, which provided recommendations concerning the mission statement, the principal one being that the current mission statement be retained.

b. Your discussion with the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 28 July 1969 concerning the above subject.

c. Your memorandum, dated 28 July 1969, subject as above, which requested comment on a draft mission statement.

2. (TS) In response to reference 1c, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed your draft mission statement, attached hereto. The draft mission statement is considered suitable if the President wishes to modify the goals upon which military directives and operations for Southeast Asia are premised. However, the Joint Chiefs of Staff desire to reiterate their concern that a publicized change in mission statement could jeopardize the credibility of the Administration and military because no substantial change in the pattern of operations in South Vietnam would follow from the mission change.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

EARLE G. WHEELER

Chairman

Joint Chiefs of Staff

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FROM: JCS

TO : CINCPAC

INFO: COMUSMACV

SUBJ: Updated Statement of Mission of U.S. Forces in SEA (U)

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1. (TS) The essential United States objective in Vietnam is, as it has been, to assist in providing to the South Vietnamese people the opportunity to determine their own political future without outside interference. This objective remains unchanged. However, there have been substantial changes in both the character of the war and RVNAF ability to assume greater responsibility for the conduct of the war. Accordingly, Vol I of JSCP-70 (page 54) is changed to read as follows:

"(2). The objective is to allow the people of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) to determine their future without outside interference. To that end, and as directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, CINCPAC and COMUSMACV should assist the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) to take over an increasing share of combat operations. The tactical goal of the combat operations is to defeat the subversion and aggression which is intended to deny self-determination to the RVN people. This overall mission encompasses the following undertakings:

"(a). Provide maximum assistance in training and equipping the RVNAF as rapidly as possible.

"(b). Continue military support for nation building. This will include accelerated pacification, civic action and security programs.

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"(c). Conduct military operations designed to accelerate improvement in the RVNAF and to continue to provide security for US forces.

"(d). Conduct military operations to reduce the flow of materiel and manpower support for enemy forces in SVN.

"(e). Maintain plans for a comprehensive air and naval campaign in Vietnam."

2. (U) Appropriate directives for employment of US forces will be revised in accordance with the above mission.

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

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JCSM-443-69

18 July 1969

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Statement of Mission of US Forces in  
Southeast Asia (U)

1. (U) Reference is made to a discussion on 14 July between you and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, concerning the above subject.

2. (TS) The purpose of this memorandum and the Appendix hereto is to assess the implications inherent in issuing a change of mission to US Forces in Southeast Asia and to provide appropriate recommendations.

3. (TS) The Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed the military situation in South Vietnam, the current statement of mission to CINCPAC, and alternative statements of mission. The views of CINCPAC and COMUSMACV on these subjects have been considered.


4. (TS) There are dangers inherent in issuing a change of mission to US Forces in Southeast Asia. While discussed in the Appendix, they are summarized as follows:

a. The credibility of the Administration and the military could be jeopardized.

b. Adverse reaction of allies could occur if they interpret the change as leading to an early, wholesale withdrawal of US Forces from Southeast Asia.

c. An adverse effect in terms of confidence and morale could occur in the populace of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) as well as in the RVN Armed Forces.

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d. The press could use casualty figures to interpret whether or not COMUSMACV is carrying out the instructions of higher authority.

e. The enemy could interpret a change in mission as a weakening of US resolve and thereby boost Viet Cong/North Vietnamese Army morale and lead to further hardening of his negotiating position.

f. A change in mission would not be likely to dissuade war critics and may lead to greater demands for inappropriate action.

5. (TS) In view of the dangers inherent in issuing a changed mission, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the current mission statement should be retained. However, recognizing the political pressures involved, two alternatives to the current mission statement are provided in the Appendix, together with a possible public announcement. Basically, alternative No. 1 updates the current mission by emphasizing existing efforts to accelerate improvement in the RVN Armed Forces and to transfer an increasing share of the combat tasks to them. By deleting the directive: "To defeat externally directed and supported communist subversion and aggression and attain a stable and independent non-communist government in South Vietnam," alternative No. 2 goes further by assuming a change in political goals and a resulting change in the military mission.


6. (TS) The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that:

a. The current mission statement, as in the Appendix, be retained.

b. If a change is deemed necessary, then alternative No. 1, in the Appendix, be considered.

c. Alternative No. 2, in the Appendix, be rejected. As discussed in paragraph 5, above, alternative No. 2 assumes a change in political goals. If a change is desired, modified political goals should be explicitly developed and provided to the Joint Chiefs of Staff so that military missions can then be derived and promulgated to CINCPAC and COMUSMACV.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

  
JOHN P. McCONNELL  
Acting Chairman  
Joint Chiefs of Staff

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# A P P E N D I X

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JCSM-443-69

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ANNEX A

CURRENT MISSION (JSCP-70, Volume I, P. 54)

To the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific:

"(2) As directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, assist the Government of South Vietnam and its Armed Forces to defeat externally directed and supported communist subversion and aggression and attain a stable and independent noncommunist government in South Vietnam. This encompasses the following subordinate undertakings:

(a) Make as difficult and costly as possible the continued support of the Viet Cong by North Vietnam, and cause North Vietnam to cease its direction of the Viet Cong insurgency. In this regard, plans should be updated and maintained for a comprehensive and coordinated air and naval campaign in North Vietnam.

(b) Defeat the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Armed Forces in South Vietnam and force the withdrawal of the North Vietnamese Armed Forces.

(c) Extend Government of South Vietnam dominion, direction, and control over all of South Vietnam.

(d) Deter CPR direct intervention and defeat such intervention if it occurs."

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ANNEX B

DRAFT ALTERNATIVE 1

PRIORITY

FROM: JCS

TO : CINCPAC

INFO: COMUSMACV

SUBJ: Updated Statement of Mission of US Forces in SEA (U)

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JCS Sends.

1. (TS) In accordance with a directive of higher authority, Vol I of JSCP-70 (page 54) is changed to read as follows:

"(2). As directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, assist the Government of Vietnam and its armed forces to defeat externally directed and supported communist subversion and aggression and attain a stable and independent non-communist government in South Vietnam. This mission encompasses the following undertakings:

"(a). Provide maximum assistance in training and equipping the RVNAF as rapidly as possible.

"(b). Continue military support for nation building. This will include accelerated pacification, civic action and security programs.

"(c). Conduct military operations to reduce the flow of materiel and manpower support for enemy forces in SVN.

"(d). Maintain plans for a comprehensive air and naval campaign in Vietnam."

2. (U) Appropriate directives for employment of US forces will be revised in accordance with the above mission.

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Annex B



ANNEX C

DRAFT ALTERNATIVE 2

FROM: JCS

TO : CINCPAC

INFO: COMUSMACV

SUBJ: Updated Statement of Mission of US Forces in SEA (U)

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JCS Sends.

1. (TS) In accordance with a directive of higher authority, Vol I of JSCP-70 (page 54) is changed to read as follows:

"(2). As directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, assist the Armed Forces of the RVN to take over an increasing share of combat operations to meet the externally directed and supported communist subversion and aggression. The objective is to allow the people of RVN to determine their future without outside interference. This mission encompasses the following undertakings:

"(a). Provide maximum assistance in training and equipping the RVNAF as rapidly as possible.

"(b). Continue military support for nation building. This will include accelerated pacification, civic action and security programs.

"(c). Conduct military operations designed to accelerate improvement in the RVNAF and to continue to provide security for US forces.

"(d). Conduct military operations to reduce the flow of materiel and manpower support for enemy forces in SVN.

"(e). Maintain plans for a comprehensive air and naval campaign in Vietnam."

2. (U) Appropriate directives for employment of US forces will be revised in accordance with the above mission.

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Annex C

ANNOUNCEMENT \*

The essential United States objective in Vietnam is, as it has been, to assist in providing to the South Vietnamese people the opportunity to determine their own political future without outside interference. This objective remains unchanged.

As I indicated on an earlier occasion, I am continuously examining our military policy in Vietnam, with a view to making changes appropriate to the changing character of the war. During the past several months, I have noted several favorable trends and I hope that they continue. The level of fighting has recently declined. Progress in training and equipping the South Vietnamese forces has been excellent. Vietnamese forces continue to perform well in combat operations.

As a result of these events, I have directed that:

- a. As rapidly as possible and to the maximum extent feasible, we progressively transfer combat tasks to the South Vietnamese armed forces, providing support to them where necessary.
- b. Our forces conduct operations designed to accelerate improvement in the South Vietnamese forces and provide military support for RVN nation-building programs.

Decisions to return home more of our men will be based on the three criteria I have established previously: First, progress in the training and equipping of the South Vietnamese; Second, progress in the Paris peace talks; and Third, the level of enemy activity.

\* Unclassified at time of announcement

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Annex D

## ANNEX E

GENERAL ABRAMS' VIEWS ON STRATEGY/TACTICS

"With respect to changing our strategy or tactics, I see no grounds in reference a or in the situation here to warrant a revolutionary change in either one.

The one war concept puts equal emphasis on military operations, improvement of RVNAF, and pacification--all of which are interrelated so that the better we do in one, the more our chance of progress in the others. The concept is a flexible one. As a practical matter, the relative priorities accorded these three efforts will vary with time and the requirements of any particular area.

Pressure is put on the enemy wherever and whenever he is found, using tactics best suited to the situation. To do less would enable the enemy to increase the intensity and duration of his recurring offensives, and of the friendly KIA, and disrupt pacification. At the same time, we are working hard to improve RVNAF performance, often by means of combined military operations, and are supporting pacification wherever required.

For example, in III CTZ US forces are conducting combined operations with the 5th, 18th, and 25th ARVN divisions and with RF units in order to improve their operational effectiveness. The 173D ABN and part of 4th INF Div in II CTZ are supporting pacification. Elements of the 4th Div are also carrying out security missions, thus freeing ARVN units to participate in operations in the vicinity of Ban Kat, where I FFV Artillery and 7th AF are supporting the ARVN forces. In I CTZ, US forces are conducting combined operations with units of the 1st and 2nd ARVN divisions to the West of the coastal areas in an attempt to preempt enemy attacks, while other US, ARVN, and territorial forces conduct pacification operations on the coast. US combat units in IV CTZ are standing down preparatory to redeploying, leaving only combat support, service support, and advisory elements in the area, plus the USAF and USN. 156 Naval craft have already been turned over to the VMN. Vietnamese sailors are phasing into 323 additional USN craft scheduled for turnover by 30 June 70.

What these examples illustrate is both a practical approach to Vietnamization and the ability of US forces to adapt to the varying requirements in SVN. And while our experience indicates we have a long way to go in II CTZ, and even farther in I and III CTZ's, before turning over full responsibility to RVNAF, a start has been made. Also a start has been made in redeploying US troops, and I am prepared to make periodic assessments to determine the feasibility of further reductions.

I do not, repeat not, believe we can do other than proceed on a step-by-step basis in transferring greater responsibility to RVNAF and on a cut-and-try basis with respect to US redeployments.

Our current one war approach from a position of increasing strength has hurt the enemy, given impetus to pacification, strengthened the RVNAF, and appears to support our negotiating position. The approach is flexible enough to adapt to developments, both enemy and friendly. Based on the total US experience in South Vietnam, I believe that, while indications (such as discussed in paras 1 and 2 above) are important to consider and weigh, the nature of the enemy and the military, political

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economic and socio-psychological structure of the Republic of Vietnam make it prudent to proceed with care. It is important to assess changes on both sides periodically as they occur and avoid anticipation of either favorable or unfavorable developments."

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CJCS MESSAGE FROM SAIGON

Following are views provided by the CJCS from Saigon concerning the subject of an updated statement of mission of US forces in SEA:

1. I have conferred at length with Admiral McCain, General Abrams, and General Rosson on the above subject, using as a vehicle the draft papers which the JCS addressed on 14 July. Our agreed views are set forth in subsequent paragraphs.

2. There are three substantive points contained in the draft updated statement of mission of U.S. Forces in SEA (attached hereto):

a. Exerting maximum pressure on the enemy is not mentioned; therefore, the earlier directive to General Abrams is superseded.

b. The updated statement recognizes and establishes the mission of giving maximum assistance to the RVNAF in training and in equipping them with modern weapons.

c. The statement recognizes and establishes the mission of assisting the RVNAF to take over an increasing share of combat operations.

3. Paragraph (2)(c) of the updated statement of mission ('attached hereto') is poorly expressed. We consider that (c) should be phrased as follows:

'Conduct military operations designed to accelerate improvement in the RVNAF and to continue to provide security for U.S. Forces.'

4. There are substantial dangers inherent in issuing a change of mission to U.S. Forces in Southeast Asia. They are:

a. The matter of the credibility of General Abrams, CINCPAC, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the President. We would anticipate that, following an announcement that a change of mission has been directed, the press will make maximum effort to ascertain the difference the change in mission has made to the operations of the troops in the field. We consider that it will be difficult if not impossible, for subordinate commanders to point out changes in operating procedures which will satisfy the news media. This will immediately create one or both of two problems: we are endeavoring at the Washington level to mislead the public and/or General Abrams is not obeying the orders he has received from the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In either case a credibility gap will be created. //

b. There is the problem of the impact on the Government of Vietnam and the Governments of the troop-contributing countries. We believe it inevitable that the Governments concerned will demand an explanation of the updated mission, to include the rationale underlying it and the impact upon the operations of their troops. Moreover, this will raise in the minds of the Vietnamese the specter of early wholesale withdrawal of U.S. Forces.

c. There will be an impact on all friendly forces in South Vietnam. General Abrams has been entirely frank and straightforward with allied commanders. He states that the commanders of all nationalities have been most responsive. The quandary would be created of how General Abrams will explain the updated statement of mission to commanders of all nationalities without shaking their confidence in him. A related matter is that he will have to revise his combined campaign plan which has been formally agreed and signed by the commanders of the RVNAF and free world military forces.

d. As to U.S. casualties: General Abrams considers that he has only a small degree of control over the level of casualties to U.S. Forces. He believes that he must continue to conduct mobile, offensive-type operations since to do otherwise would give the enemy initiative, with an inevitable rise in U.S. casualties and a setback in the pacification process. We would expect the press to watch the casualty figures very closely and to interpret any increase, or indeed any lack of diminution, as evidence that General Abrams is not carrying out the instructions of higher authority.

e. As to the effect on the enemy: This area is hard to assess; however, we would anticipate that the enemy would harden his negotiating stance in Paris, if that is possible. Moreover, we would anticipate that an announcement of change in mission of U.S. Forces with the implication of lessened pressure would give heart to VC/NVA Forces operating in South Vietnam.

f. As to the overall effect on those opposing the war in Southeast Asia: While the President, is, of course, a better judge of this factor than we, we believe that this move will not repeat not satisfy this group. On the contrary, we consider that it will

encourage those opposing administration policy to demand further and greater concessions to their views.

5. As we see it, there are three alternatives open to us in descending order of desirability:

- a. Make no change in the directive to our commanders in the field.
- b. Reissue the present JCS guidance to CINCPAC as contained in JSCP 70; namely:

"As directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, assist the Government of Vietnam and its Armed Forces to defeat externally directed and supported communist subversion and aggression and attain a stable and independent non-communist government in South Vietnam."

To this we would propose adding from the draft updated statement of mission the following:

"This updated mission encompasses the following undertakings: subparagraphs (a) (b) (d) (e)"

(NOTE: This formulation would delete subparagraph (c).")

- c. The draft updated statement of mission of U.S. Forces in SEA as amended by my comments in paragraph 3 above.

6. In the light of the problem areas set forth earlier, Admiral McCain, General Abrams, General Rosson and I concur, in recommending that alternatives 5b and 5c be rejected."

D R A F T

FROM: JCS  
TO : CINCPAC  
INFO: COMUSMACV  
SUBJ: Updated Statement of Mission of US Forces in SEA (U)

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JCS Sends..

1. (TS) In accordance with a directive of higher authority, Vol I of JSCP-70 (page 54) is changed to read as follows:

"(2). As directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, assist the Armed Forces of the RVN to take over an increasing share of combat operations to meet the externally directed and supported communist subversion and aggression. The objective is to allow the people of RVN to determine their future without outside interference. This updated mission encompasses the following undertakings:

"(a). Provide maximum assistance in training and equipping the RVNAF as rapidly as possible.

"(b). Continue military support for nation building. This will include accelerated pacification, civic action and security programs.

"(c). Conduct military operations as necessary to accelerate improvement in the RVNAF and to provide continuing security for US forces.

"(d). Conduct military operations to reduce the flow of materiel and manpower support for enemy forces in SVN.

"(e). Maintain plans for a comprehensive air and naval campaign in Vietnam."

2. (U) Appropriate directives for employment of US forces will be revised in accordance with the above mission.

\* Original draft which CJCS carried to Saigon 15 July 1969 and commented on in the message from CJCS (Not recommended by JCS)

TOP SECRET-SENSITIVE

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Annex F